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 THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH 
ACT OF 2018 ON BANK MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:  
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR DE NOVO BANKS AND CRA 
LENDING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the 2008 Financial Crisis, bank merger and acquisition 
(“M&A”) activity came to a near standstill.1  Banks lost fortunes on large-
scale mortgage defaults, interbank and consumer lending froze, and fi-
nancial institutions once seen as cornerstones of Wall Street began to 
fail.2  The financial turmoil risked instability of the financial market as a 
whole.3  The initial culprit was seen to be weaknesses in regulation.4  In 
response to the Financial Crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) to 
decelerate the crisis and re-stabilize the financial industry.5  Once fears 
of complete financial meltdown were allayed, Congress focused on in-
creasing regulatory oversight to prevent future risky behavior.6  Post-Fi-
nancial Crisis regulations purposefully slowed certain financial 
 
 1. See Jacqueline Doherty, Rekindling the Urge to Merge, BARRON’S (Sept. 25, 2010, 
12:01 AM), https://www.barrons.com/arti-
cles/SB50001424052970204277704575508291090222902?tesla=y (discussing M&A 
dropoff during the Finacial Crisis and how regulations enacted in response to the crisis was 
intended to increase merger activity). 
 2. See Nick Mathiason, Three Weeks that Changed the World, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 
2008), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/dec/28/markets-credit-crunch-banking-
2008 (providing a timeline of the Financial Crisis and highlighting events that led to the col-
lapse of several major banks in 2008). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/business/economy/04fed.html?mtr-
ref=www.google.com&gwh=3158ECCE7E41650E3795698E0C123923&gwt=pay. 
 5. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was passed by Congress and 
signed into law by President George W. Bush on Oct. 3, 2008.  Its main purpose was to pre-
vent collapse of the United States’ financial system during the subprime mortgage crisis by 
restoring liquidity to credit markets. Martin N. Baily et al., The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act 
on Financial Stability and Economic Growth, 3 THE RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. OF THE SOC. 
SCIS. 1, 29 (2017). 
 6. Greg Ip, The Financial Crisis Made Us Afraid of Risk—For a While, WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-financial-crisis-made-us-afraid-of-risk-
for-a-while-1536379306.  
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activities.7  The fragile economy and increased regulatory oversight over 
all banks stunted banking activity, lessened credit availability, and pre-
vented the formation of de novo banks.8   
Progressing from the Financial Crisis, Congress reevaluated ele-
ments of Dodd-Frank.9  One of the most significant deregulation efforts 
was the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Economic Growth Act”) signed by President Trump on May 24, 
2018.10  Section 165 of the Economic Growth Act raised the total asset 
threshold at which financial institutions were automatically labeled sys-
temically important financial institutions (“SIFI”) and subjected to 
heightened regulatory oversight from $50 billion to $250 billion.11  Rais-
ing the total asset threshold will give financial institutions that are slightly 
below $50 billion the freedom to grow significantly through increased 
M&A activity before they need to fear SIFI regulatory oversight.12  This 
growth will strengthen the overall financial economy in two primary 
ways.13  First, it will facilitate and incentivize the creation of de novo 
banks.14  Second, it will alleviate the unbanked and underbanked by in-
creasing access to credit and banking tools in needed communities.15 
This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II provides a general over-
view of Dodd-Frank and the $50 billion threshold’s impact on M&A ac-
tivity.16  Part III discusses factors that led to the passage of the Economic 
Growth Act.17  Part IV explains how the total asset threshold increase will 
 
 7. Doherty, supra note 1. 
 8. See Thomas P. Vartanian, How Dodd-Frank Makes M&A More Difficult, AM. 
BANKER, Aug. 21, 2013, https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/how-dodd-frank-makes-
m-amp-a-more-difficult (discussing factors that were seen to impede M&A activity). 
 9. David W. Perkins et al., Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (P.L. 115-174) and Selected Policy Issues, CONG. RES. SER. (June 6, 2018). 
 10. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act § 2155, 4 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2012); 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 11. § 2155.   
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Lea Nonninger, M&A Activity is on the Upswing at Retail Banks, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(May 30, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/merger-acquisition-activity-up-
swing-banking-2018-5. 
 14. The term de novo bank refers to a newly chartered bank or bank that has been in 
operation for five years or less. It is typically the case that a de novo bank is subject to stricter 
regulatory scrutiny in its start-up years, including higher than minimum capital and a require-
ment that there be a preset business plan. BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL, 
THE FED. RES. DIV. SUPERVISION & REG. (2017), available at https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/publications/files/bhc.pdf. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
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likely increase M&A activity.18  Part V discusses the impact on subse-
quent M&A activity and why M&A activity will strengthen the financial 
industry.19 Part VI concludes the Note. 
II. RESTRICTIONS ON $50 BILLION BANK HOLDING COMPANIES IN DODD-
FRANK AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY 
Dodd-Frank was enacted in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis 
to increase oversight and regulatory authority over large financial institu-
tions that were seen as major drivers of the crisis.20  One of the main 
purposes of the legislation was to “prevent or mitigate risks to the finan-
cial stability of the United States that could arise from the material finan-
cial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected fi-
nancial institutions.”21  To accomplish this, Dodd-Frank originally 
required the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (“the Fed”) to apply 
heightened regulations—often referred to as Enhanced Prudential Stand-
ards (“EPS”)—to bank holding companies22 (“BHCs”) and banks with 
total assets of at least $50 billion.23  Under the statute, these financial 
institutions with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or greater were 
automatically designated as SIFIs.24  The statute grants the Fed a signifi-
cant amount of discretion to apply the increased regulations and enhanced 
scrutiny to financial institutions based on their unique risk.25  These “en-
hanced supervision and prudential standards” established in section 165 
of Dodd-Frank were designed to be more stringent than the standards ap-
plicable to smaller institutions that “do not present similar risks to the 
financial stability of the United States.”26   
 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V.  
 20. Christine Daleiden, The Legal Parameters of the Financial Crisis, 13 HAW. B.J. 6 
(2009). 
 21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165(a), 12 U.S.C. § 
5365 (2012) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 22. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (defining a bank holding company as “any company which has 
control over any bank” with activities “closely related to banking.”). 
 23. Fact Sheet: Everything You Need To Know About the $50 Billion Threshold, BETTER 
MKTS. (Nov. 2, 2015), https://bettermarkets.com/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20-
%20$50%20billion%20Threshold%20-%2011-02-2015.pdf. 
 24. § 165(a)(1); MARC LABONTE & DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RES. SERV., R45036, THE 
$50 BILLION THRESHOLD IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT:  KEY FINDINGS (DEC. 6, 2017), available 
at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45036.pdf. 
 25. § 165(b)(3). 
 26. § 165(a). 
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The regulatory requirements that accompany SIFI designation in-
clude annual stress tests, capital requirements, resolution plans, liquidity 
requirements, counterparty limits, and risk management.27  Resolution 
plans are required to untangle failing SIFIs by identifying any affiliates 
and how they are protected from risks arising from subsidiary activities, 
ownership structure, and identification of all assets owned.28  Dodd-Frank 
also requires reports of any credit exposure with other organizations.29 
A primary reason why financial institutions attempt to avoid SIFI 
designation is the costs associated with the EPS.  For example, Zions 
Bancorporation merged with its national bank subsidiary, Zions Bank, 
N.A. and grew to $66 billion in total assets as a result of the merger.30 
After the merger, the FSOC approved its application to shed the SIFI sta-
tus, a status that reportedly cost Zions “hundreds of millions of dollars in 
terms of software . . . and 500 full-time compliance, risk and audit pro-
fessionals.”31  Zions is the largest banking organization to shed its desig-
nation to date.32  Non-bank financial institutions have also saved money 
as a result of shedding their SIFI designation.33  AIG reported that it 
would save as much as $150 million in annual compliance costs after los-
ing SIFI designation.34  Within months of the regulations being lifted, 
AIG’s chief executive stated that he expected M&A activity to increase 
with this new extra money.35  Since 2016, all four non-bank financial in-
stitutions that were once designated as SIFIs—General Electric Capital, 
AIG, Metlife, and Prudential—have applied and reversed their SIFI des-
ignation.36  Upon shedding their SIFI designation, chief executives from 
 
 27. §§ 165(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
 28. § 165(d). 
 29. Id. 
 30. V. GERARD COMIZIO & NATHAN S. BROWNBACK, FSOC CLEARS ZION’S PLAN TO 
ELIMINATE SIFI STATUS, CLEARING THE WAY TO SHED ITS BANK HOLDING COMPANY, FRIED 
FRANK (JULY 23, 2018), https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/072318Financial-
ServicesAlertFSOCClearsZionsPlan2.pdf.  
 31. Zions Bank Sheds SIFI Status, ABA BANKING J. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://bankingjour-
nal.aba.com/2018/09/zions-bank-sheds-sifi-status/. 
 32. Comizio, supra note 30. 
 33. See Allstair Gray, AIG Sheds $150m in Costs Along with SIFI Label, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 
1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/31b36b9a-a662-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c (“The in-
surer will also no longer be required to clear as big regulatory hurdles to complete large ac-
quisitions.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Ted Mann, GE Files to End Fed Oversight After Shrinking GE Capital, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-files-to-end-fed-oversight-after-shrinking-
ge-capital-1459423851. 
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General Electric Capital and Metlife believe the regulatory savings will 
allow the companies to focus on industry innovations and get back to 
company roots.37 
Dodd-Frank impeded M&A activity due to its enhanced regula-
tory oversight.38  The 2,300-page bill promulgated 400 new rules and 
mandates for all financial institutions, not just those with over $50 billion 
in total assets.39  Previously, BHCs were exempt from capital require-
ments once they reached $500 million in assets, but Dodd-Frank ended 
that exemption.40  Under Dodd-Frank, financial institutions with greater 
than $10 billion in total assets were required to enhance their risk man-
agement programs and become supervised by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).41 
BHCs below $50 billion in total assets were reluctant to under-
take M&A activity that pushed them above the $50 billion threshold due 
to the additional regulatory costs associated with complying with the 
EPS.42  There are nearly seventy BHCs with total assets ranging from $10 
billion and $50 billion.43  Banks below $10 billion would still merge at a 
rapid pace to offset regulatory costs, but they were cognizant of the SIFI 
regulations that would be implemented if they surpassed the $50 billion 
threshold.44  Any new M&A activity considerations now incorporate 
 
 37. See Ted Mann & Ryan Tracy, GE Capital Sheds ‘Systemically Important’ Label, 
WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-capital-sheds-systemically-im-
portant-label-for-too-big-to-fail-firms-1467205963 (“The FSOC vote clears the way for GE 
to borrow and spend like an industrial company again, a potential boon to investors who have 
cheered Chief Executive Jeff Immelt’s decision to move back town the company’s roots as a 
manufacturer of high-tech machines like wind turbines, locomotives and medical scanners.”). 
 38. Vartanian, supra note 8. 
 39. Vartanian, supra note 8. 
 40. Vartanian, supra note 8. 
 41. See Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481 (2012) (“Title X, referred to in par. (4), is 
title X of Pub. L. 111-203, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1955, known as the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010, which enacted subchapter V (§5481 et seq.) of this chapter . . . .”). 
 42. DAVID C. INGLES & SVEN G. MICKISCH, INCREASE IN SIFI THRESHOLD SHOULD SPUR 
MORE BANK M&A ACTIVITY, SKADDEN (APR. 25, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/in-
sights/publications/2018/04/quarterly-insights/increase-in-sifi-threshold-should-spur-more-
bank.   
 43. Id. 
 44. Why Dodd-Frank Increased Banking Industry Consolidation, THE WHARTON 
SCHOOL U. PA. (Sept. 5, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/banking-in-
dustry-acquisitions/. 
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regulatory costs into decisions to acquire banks that would increase total 
assets above $50 billion.45  
One such example of the $50 billion threshold and SIFI designa-
tion influencing bank M&A activity occurred in 2015.46  CIT Group’s 
acquisition of OneWest Bank pushed it over the $50 billion (assets now 
$67 billion), the first time since the passage of Dodd-Frank that a trans-
action created a SIFI.47  The viability of the deal centered around a sig-
nificant acquisition to put CIT Group comfortably above the $50 billion 
asset level as opposed to just slightly above.48  This is because the SIFI 
regulations that come with exceeding the $50 billion threshold are not 
economically feasible unless the projected earnings offset costs and pro-
vide enough profit to justify the additional regulatory costs.49  Had the 
deal put CIT Group at $52 billion—just above the $50 billion threshold—
and not $67 billion, CIT Group Chief Executive John Thain stated the 
acquisition would not have been worth the regulatory costs.50 
III. THE ECONOMIC GROWTH, REGULATORY RELIEF AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT AND THE NEED FOR THE THRESHOLD INCREASE 
In March of 2018, the United States Senate passed the Economic 
Growth Act to amend parts of Dodd-Frank.51  The bipartisan bill52 ad-
justed the asset threshold at which BHCs become designated SIFIs,53 
while also exempting smaller banks from certain loans, mortgages, and 
trading requirements.54  Under this new legislation, BHCs with assets be-
tween $100 billion and $250 billion—while stripped of SIFI designa-
tion—may still face periodic stress tests and other enhanced supervision 
 
 45. Louise Bowman, US Regional Banks Gear Up for M&A Bonanza, EUROMONEY (July 
23, 2018), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b1965794qm479g/us-regional-banks-gear-
up-for-mampa-bonanza. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Saabira Chaudhuri, CIT Group to Buy OneWest; Profit Tops Estimates, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cit-group-to-buy-onewest-profit-tops-
estimates-1406025881 (“That is because the avalanche of regulations that comes with topping 
$50 billion isn’t worth itwithout a significantly bigger earnings engine.”). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act § 2155, 4 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2012); 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
      54.   Id. 
2019] SIFI BANK M&A 365 
at the discretion of the Fed.55  With this discretion, the Fed considers other 
factors of a BHC to determine whether to impose enhanced regulatory 
scrutiny.56  These factors include the BHC’s complexity of services, 
cross-jurisdictional activities, interconnectedness with other financial in-
stitutions, and the likelihood that the BHC’s services can be substituted 
with those of another bank in the event of dissolution.57  Additionally, 
financial institutions with $250 billion in assets automatically remained 
subject to the EPS under the Economic Growth Act, a threshold previ-
ously set at $50 billion.58  
There are numerous reasons why the $50 billion threshold was 
sensible at the time it was set.59  The future of many banks and financial 
institutions was unclear when Congress passed Dodd-Frank.60  This un-
certainty understandably justified a lower threshold at a time when public 
confidence in the financial system was wavering.61  In the middle of the 
Financial Crisis, moral hazard was predominate in discussions regarding 
bailouts and was potentially overstated at the time.62  Legislatures felt that 
banks would engage in riskier behavior after watching the federal gov-
ernment bail out financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and AIG with infusions of capital after passage of the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act and the creation of Troubled Asset Re-
lief Program (“TARP”).63  To combat this moral hazard issue, legislators 
agreed on a $50 billion threshold to regulate a greater number of bank 
holding companies, provide greater oversight, and prevent risky behav-
ior.64 
Arguments against the need for an increased threshold are not 
convincing.65  Some have argued that the increase in total asset threshold 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act §2155, 4 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2012); 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RES. SERV., R43413, COSTS OF 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:  A RETROSPECTIVE 
(SEPT. 12, 2018) (discussing waning confidence in the economy and the governmental goal to 
end the financial panic).  
 60. Webel, supra note 59. 
 61. Webel, supra note 59. 
 62. Labonte, supra note 24, at 14–17. 
 63. James Surowiecki, Moral Hazard and the Crisis, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 14, 2010), 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/james-surowiecki/moral-hazard-and-the-crisis. 
 64. Labonte, supra note 24, at 14–17. 
 65. Labonte, supra note 24, at 14–17. 
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raises the riskiness of the financial industry because the newly exempted 
banks might take greater risks.66  This is unlikely, however, because 
banks are still regulated by multiple regulators and are still accountable 
to shareholders with the Financial Crisis fresh in their minds.67  For ex-
ample, state banks are regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (“FDIC”) or the Federal Reserve System and their specific state’s 
bank regulator.68  Nationally chartered banks are regulated by the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency.69  Banks are also accountable to their 
shareholders who pressure bank officers to reduce riskiness and 
strengthen capital if banks become risky and start to report losses.70  
Former supporters of Dodd-Frank’s $50 billion threshold now 
agree the threshold was set too low.71  Barney Frank, former chairman of 
the House Financial Services Committee, admitted that the $50 billion 
number was a “mistake”72 and that he would vote against it now.73  Sen-
ator Chris Dodd recently agreed that the $50 billion threshold was a mis-
take in September of 2018 at a conference for the ten year anniversary of 
the Financial Crisis in Washington, D.C.74  Daniel Tarullo, former mem-
ber of the Board of Governors of the Fed, also agreed that the threshold 
was set too low.75 
 
 66. Labonte, supra note 24, at 14–17. 
 67. Julie Stackhouse, Why Didn’t Bank Regulators Prevent the Financial Crisis?, FED. 
RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, (May 2017), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-econ-
omy/2017/may/why-didnt-bank-regulators-prevent-financial-crisis. 
 68. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE 
ACTIVITIES 209 (5th ed. 2018). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Bert Ely, Big Banks, Medium Banks and Why the Distinction Really Matters, THE 
HILL, (June 02, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/335965-big-banks-me-
dium-banks-and-why-the-distinction-really-matters. 
 71. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member of the Board of Governors, Fed. Res. Bd.,  Departing 
Thoughts at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey (Apr. 
4, 2017). 
 72. Dodd-Frank Author: Current SIFI Threshold is ‘Mistake’, ABA BANKING J. (Nov. 
21, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/barney-frank-why-i-would-vote-no-on-senate-
bill-to-amend-dodd-frank-commentary.html. 
 73. Barney Frank, Why I Would Vote ‘No’ on Senate Bill to Amend Dodd-Frank, CNBC 
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/barney-frank-why-i-would-vote-no-on-
senate-bill-to-amend-dodd-frank-commentary.html.. 
 74. Senator Christopher Dodd, U.S. Senate, Remarks at the September 2008 Financial 
Crisis: A Legal Retrospective Conference (Sept. 21, 2018). 
 75. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Member of the Board of Governors, Fed. Res. Bd.,  Departing 
Thoughts at The Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey (Apr. 
4, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20170404a.htm (discuss-
ing how the $50 billion cutoff was “too low”). 
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Opponents of the $50 billion threshold argue that financial insti-
tutions with total assets slightly above $50 billion are not systemically 
important and that total assets is but one factor that may make a bank 
systemically important to the financial industry.76  Rather, they suggest 
that other factors may better assess how important a financial institution 
is to our economy.77 These factors include interconnectedness, substitut-
ability, complexity, and cross-jurisdiction activity.78  Raising the SIFI as-
set threshold and giving the Fed discretion to use different factors in as-
sessing a financial institution’s systemic importance was needed as we 
move forward from the Financial Crisis.79 
IV. IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF RAISING SIFI THRESHOLD WITHIN THE 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY AND THE INCREASE OF M&A ACTIVITY 
The Economic Growth Act targeted the enhanced regulations of 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s $50 billion threshold and immediately provided 
regulatory relief for numerous financial institutions.80  Upon enactment, 
BHCs with total consolidated assets of less than $100 billion were imme-
diately freed from the EPSs.81  The Economic Growth Act gives the Fed 
discretion to release banks in the $100 billion to $250 billion bracket from 
SIFI designation prior to the eighteen months from the enactment date 
deadline if it deems fit, and to reinstate them as SIFIs afterward if neces-
sary.82 
The original $50 billion threshold was applicable to thirty-eight 
BHCs, while the new $250 billion threshold leaves eight BHCs regulated 
as SIFIs.83  The thirty BHCs deregulated by the legislation hold a com-
bined $5.3 trillion in assets,84 or roughly twenty-five percent of the total 
assets in the banking sector.85  Collectively these thirty-eight BHCs 
 
 76. Labonte, supra note 24, at 20. 
 77. Labonte, supra note 24, at 20. 
 78. Labonte, supra note 24, at 13. 
 79. Labonte, supra note 24, at 1. 
 80. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act § 2155, 4 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2012); 82 Fed. Reg. 9308 (Mar. 6, 2017); see also Gregg Gelzinis, Scrapping $50B 
Threshold will let 30 Big Banks off the Hook, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18, 2017. 
 81. § 2155. 
 82. § 2155. 
 83. Gelzinis, supra note 80. 
 84. Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR. (June 
30, 2018), https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/hcsgreaterthan10b.aspx (last visted Feb. 
9, 2019). 
 85. Gelzinis, supra note 80. 
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received $65 billion in TARP bailout funds and hundreds of billions more 
in additional forms of government support.86 This new legislation frees 
twenty of the thirty-eight BHCs with less than $250 billion in assets from 
the subjective portion of the Fed’s annual stress tests.87  However, Federal 
Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said during his nomination hearing that he 
would continue to have “meaningful” stress tests for banks in that range.88   
Banks slightly below the previous $50 billion threshold can now 
reach $100 billion in total assets before fearing a SIFI designation.89  The 
deregulation creates a favorable atmosphere for M&A activity for finan-
cial institutions with slightly less than $50 billion in total assets.90  Previ-
ously, BHCs with assets just less than $50 billion shied away from M&A 
activity that would have pushed them above the $50 billion threshold.  
For example, Astoria Financial Corporation proposed a merger with New 
York Community Bancorp.91  Because the transaction would have pushed 
New York Community over the $50 billion total asset threshold it was 
ultimately abandoned.92  Astoria was ultimately sold to Sterling Ban-
corp—with roughly $30 billion in assets—which as a result remained 
well below the $50 billion threshold.93  As of this Note, it has only been 
several months since passage of the legislation and already retail bank 
M&A activity is on the upswing.94 
A.  Fed Regulatory Discretion over BHCs between $100 and $250 
 
 86. Gelzinis, supra note 80. 
 87. Donna Borak, Fed: Banks Under $250 Billion Threshold Get Break on Stress Test, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-banks-under-250-billion-
threshold-get-break-on-stress-tests-1485812085. 
 88. Emily Stewart, The Bank Deregulation Bill the Senate Just Passed, Explained, VOX 
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/6/17081508/senate-bank-
ing-bill-crapo-regulation. 
 89. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act § 2155, 4 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (2012). 
 90. See generally Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evi-
dence from Bank Branch Deregulation, 111 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 639 (1996) (discussing how 
deregulation of bank branching and other areas of banking can result in positive economic 
growth). 
 91. DAVID INGLES & SVEN MICKISCH, UPCOMING UPTICK IN BANK M&A ACTIVITY?, 
SKADDEN. ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (MAY 14, 2018), https://www.skad-
den.com/insights/publications/2018/05/upcoming-uptick-in-bank-ma-activity. 
 92. Ben Levisohn, Astoria Financial & New York Community Bancorp: No Merger For 
You!, BARRONS (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.barrons.com/articles/astoria-financial-new-
york-community-bancorp-no-merger-for-you-1482340847. 
 93. Ingles, supra note 91. 
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Billion 
Dodd-Frank’s heightened regulatory scrutiny for SIFIs of $50 bil-
lion or greater was enacted at a time when the public and legislators de-
manded more accountability from financial institutions.95  Other factors 
other than asset size may provide better metrics in determining which fi-
nancial institutions warrant the enhanced SIFI regulations.96  A BHC with 
assets between $100 and $250 billion experiencing distress or failure 
could potentially destabilize the financial system due to its complexity.97  
Large BHCs can engage in various sophisticated financial services, such 
as securities trading, insurance, swap dealing, custodial services, and 
clearing and settlement services, as well as a myriad of other specialized 
services.98  While these activities are not considered risky individually, 
“they are outside the traditional prudential regulatory model for commer-
cial banking and increase the number of markets and activities through 
which an institution could trigger a systemic event or spread systemic 
risk.”99  
Even though the Economic Growth Act will create fertile ground 
for M&A activity, the Fed’s regulatory discretion for BHCs between 
$100 billion to $250 billion will allow for proactive prevention of risky 
behavior, while examining a BHC’s overall importance to the econ-
omy.100  First, the Fed can determine if a financial institution is systemi-
cally important by examining the interconnectedness of the financial in-
stitution as compared to other financial companies.101  During the 
Financial Crisis, bank interconnectedness impacted third parties102 and 
worsened the financial crisis.103  When a distressed bank is connected to 
other financial institutions, the distress can spread to connected organiza-
tions and weaken the financial industry as a whole.104 
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Second, the Fed may also look at the substitutability of the insti-
tution to determine “whether other banks or financial institutions could 
perform the critical functions currently performed by the bank in question 
should it fail.”105  This is important because a BHC that offers unique 
services that another financial institution cannot replicate in a time of dis-
tress, that BHC should be considered systemically important.106  If a spe-
cific BHC can be substituted for another in the event of failure, then it is 
less likely that BHC is systemically important. 107  
Third, the Fed can examine a bank’s cross-jurisdiction activity, 
which considers how far a BHC’s services reach and how many jurisdic-
tions will suffer from any distress or failure.108  If a BHC operates in nu-
merous jurisdictions and the distress potentially impacts markets locally, 
nationally, and globally, then that BHC should be seen as systemically 
important to the financial industry as a whole.109  These factors are help-
ful in identifying a BHC’s overall importance to the economy in conjunc-
tion with an increased asset size threshold.110 
V. IMPACT OF INCREASED M&A ACTIVITY 
There are numerous incentives for financial institutions to merge 
or acquire other financial institutions.111  Merging is a viable way to scale 
operations by expanding the customer base, consolidating operations, ex-
panding geographic footprint, and increasing capital to lend and invest.112  
Acquiring another BHC also provides an opportunity to fill any financial 
product gaps that would be easier to incorporate as opposed to developing 
the product by scratch.113  Larger banks are incentivized to merge because 
they already have infrastructure in place for compliance, risk 
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management, accounting, operations, and information technology.114 
These larger banks can absorb smaller banks without much increase in 
compliance costs as long as they stay below any SIFI thresholds.115 
Growing an organization through a merger or acquisition can 
benefit the organization and the industry overall.116  In particular, bank 
M&A activity promotes improving the quality of bank staff who bring 
with them new skills and knowledge of the industry.117  Bank mergers in 
the same markets can facilitate cost savings by reducing redundant per-
sonnel and facilities, which can improve operational efficiencies.118 
Merging also increases the access to funds or assets to contribute to new 
research and development, which in turn diversifies products and services 
that an organization can offer.119  These new skills and resources help 
organizations serve a wider customer base while reducing overhead 
costs.120  With the numerous incentives for banks to merge or acquire 
other banks, an increase in M&A activity is likely.  An increase in such 
activity will have certain effects, the most prevalent of which will be (1) 
the incentive for formation of de novo banks due to the increased likeli-
hood of the new bank getting acquired by BHCs now free to increase total 
assets greater than $50 billion and (2) the increased access to credit in 
smaller communities.121 
A.  De Novo Banks and Their Impact 
De novo banks are a sign of economic growth.122  De novo banks 
refer to newly chartered banks or banks that have been in operation for 
five years or less.123  New banks help fill gaps in the provision of banking 
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services, increase competition, and ultimately strengthen the community 
bank sector.124  In addition to difficulties for de novo banks to raise capital 
from the public after the financial crisis, these banks became subject to 
stricter regulations as regulators intentionally made opening new banks 
more difficult.125  De novo banks are seen as riskier because they fail at a 
rate of almost double to that of more established banks.126  As a result, 
the FDIC was criticized for approving deposit insurance for new banks 
leading up to the financial crisis.127  Consequently, the FDIC increased 
regulatory burdens to make it harder for de novo banks to gain FDIC in-
surance.128  Some of the regulatory burdens include requiring higher cap-
ital ratios and increasing emphasis on compliance with the Bank Secrecy 
Act and anti-money laundering requirements, implementation of enter-
prise risk management systems, and effective corporate governance.129 
From 1990 to 2008, over 2,000 de novo banks were formed.130  In 
the last quarter of 2016, the FDIC only approved two new banks—the 
most since 2008.131 From 2009 to 2015, the FDIC approved only three 
applications for deposit insurance—one per year from 2013 to 2015.132  
This is drastically low compared to a high of 299 applications for new 
banks in 2005 alone, 237 of which were approved.133  Historically, de 
novo activity has decreased during recessions.134  This was true in the 
2008 Financial Crisis as there was an average of 154 annual approvals 
leading up to it, and only seven de novo banks approved by the FDIC 
following it.135  As we claw back from the Financial Crisis, we have seen 
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an increase of de novo activity.136  As of September of 2018, just six 
months after passage of the Economic Growth Act, there have been 
twenty-one applications for federal deposit insurance filed with the FDIC, 
more than double the applications filed in all of 2017.137 
BHCs with total assets just below $50 billion will begin targeting 
de novo banks and other BHCs to acquire, which is a direct result of rais-
ing the SIFI asset threshold.138  This M&A activity will allow BHCs to 
both enter new markets as they acquire new customers and create a fertile 
environment for the formation of de novo banks.139  As M&A activity 
increases, de novo banks formation may increase as investors hope their 
newly formed banks may be acquired by growing BHCs.140  In addition, 
as mergers increase, senior officers of acquired banks often sell their 
stock positions during the merger and then lose their job because of per-
sonnel efficiencies and consolidations.141  Once their non-compete agree-
ments expire, these senior officers can use their experience and capital to 
start de novo banks.142  
This deregulation effort is helping reduce the cost of capital 
needed to operate BHCs, thus allowing for reinvestment in technology 
and other infrastructure.143  Bank investors view the Economic Growth 
Act’s deregulation as an opportunity to create de novo banks due to less-
ened economic burden related to regulatory oversight for BHCs over-
all.144  This will create a fertile environment for an increase in the number 
of community banks, which will provide financial services like access to 
credit to the previously underbanked and unbanked.145  As more banking 
needs are met, BHCs that previously fell just under the $50 billion 
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threshold will now have the freedom to acquire these de novo banks and 
continue to serve new consumers.146  
De novo banks help fill gaps in banking services, increase com-
petition, and ultimately strengthen the community bank sector.147  In fact, 
de novo banks increase credit and capital  access to the agricultural in-
dustry, small businesses, and residential mortgage borrowers.148  Accord-
ing to the FDIC, de novo banks invest a large share of their assets into 
small business loans and are responsible for approximately forty to fifty 
percent of small business loans nationwide.149  De novo banks are also 
instrumental in alleviating unbanked and underbanked segments of the 
population.150  In 2017, six and a half percent (6.5%)—approximately 
eight million—of United States households were unbanked.151  Approxi-
mately an additional eighteen percent (18.7%) of U.S. households (24.2 
million) were underbanked, meaning that the household had a checking 
or savings account but also obtained financial products and services out-
side of the banking system.152  De novo banks will enter these markets to 
serve a banking need, but smaller de novo banks might not have resources 
to offer the same state of the art technology as larger banks.153  New con-
sumers will continue to be financially served when middle market 
banks—who are now able to grow without gaining the SIFI designation—
acquire these de novo banks.154  These middle market banks will begin to 
serve the underserved and increase the community’s access to sophisti-
cated financial products.  
 
 146. Grace, supra note 143. 
 147. De Novo Banks, supra note 122. 
 148. Wooten, supra note 144. 
 149. Wooten, supra note 144. 
 150. Wooten, supra note 144. 
 151. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NAT’L SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS (2018), available at https://www.fdic.gov/householdsur-
vey/2017/2017report.pdf. 
 152. Id.; See generally Joseph A. Smith, Jr. Saving for the Poor: The Hidden Benefits of 
Electronic Banking: A Review and Response, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 (2001) (discussing the 
benefits of technology for alleviating issues of unbanked and underbanked).  
 153. Paul Davis, Window May be Closing for Small Banks to Compete for Small Business, 
AM. BANKER, Nov. 6, 2018. 
 154. FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ISSUE 
BRIEF (June 2016), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/docs/20160610_financial_inclusion_cea_issue_brief.pdf. 
2019] SIFI BANK M&A 375 
B.  Increase in Access to Credit As a Result of De Novo Banks 
The federal government has emphasized the importance of finan-
cial inclusion and access to credit for local communities.155  Financial 
inclusion and access to credit strengthen communities by serving as a cat-
alyst to combat poverty and spur economic enterprises.156  However, the 
credit needs of small businesses tend to not attract larger, multijurisdic-
tional banks, which leads to small businesses relying on their local banks 
to fill the credit void.157  Medium-sized businesses may be able to access 
lenders and providers from larger areas, but they still do not generally 
have the access to national capital markets which may be available to 
larger corporations.158  As part of the Community Reinvestment Act 
(“CRA”), banks must provide their regulators with their records of meet-
ing the community credit needs, including low and moderate income 
neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and sound operations of the in-
stitution.159  Acquisition of de novo banks allows larger banks to meet 
CRA requirements by offering more sophisticated financial services, 
which should expand their consumer base.160  
More consumers will soon enjoy modern financial technology 
with increased M&A activity.161  Technology capabilities improve effi-
ciencies for banks and differentiate banks in the marketplace.162  Infor-
mational technology alone significantly contributes to productivity, and 
consumers attribute technology to better customer experience.163  Small 
banks can outsource their technology capabilities, but that does not mean 
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thier access costs the same as large banks access.164  Larger banks may 
benefit from volume discounts that are not offered to small banks which 
may explain why smaller institutions are slower to adopt new technolo-
gies.165  Banking applications have made waiting in a queue at the bank 
to deposit money, withdraw money, and even get a loan a thing of the 
past.  Now, mobile smartphones allow consumers to access financial tools 
at any time, not just during banking hours.166 
C.  Mitigating Concerns of Reduced Competition Among 
Community Banks 
Technology, antitrust laws, and competing factors mitigate argu-
ments that increased M&A activity will reduce the number of community 
banks that are important for rural communities.167  Some have argued that 
the increased M&A activity will result in fewer total banks serving com-
munities because of an overall reduced number of competitors.168  This 
reasoning is unfounded because the resulting bank’s regulator will review 
prospective mergers to determine if they violate antitrust laws by sub-
stantially lessening competition.169  With any bank M&A activity, the 
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice will also examine the 
market and weigh different factors when evaluating competitive effects 
of the proposed M&A activity.170  These factors include deposit concen-
tration figures, branch networks, and both the entry of small firms and 
their ability to expand quickly.171  This antitrust oversight assuages argu-
ments of consolidated marketplaces that may result from increased M&A 
activity.172 
M&A activity is also affected by competing factors, and raising 
the SIFI threshold is but one element of why banks will merge or acquire 
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other banks.173  Many financial institutions are subject to regulatory obli-
gations and remediation stemming from deficiencies in their compliance 
infrastructure, such as compliance functions surrounding anti-money 
laundering, the Bank Secrecy Act, and consumer finance compliance.174  
These previous regulatory obligations generally prohibit BHCs from 
making substantial expansionary acquisitions or investments.175 
Technology is also playing a role in mitigating M&A activity 
concerns.176  Banks have begun to reconsider their brick-and-mortar lo-
cations as technology reduces the need for consumers to visit physical 
locations for their banking needs.177  Financial institutions can now intro-
duce themselves to a community via technology and not necessarily 
through physical location. 178 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After the 2008 Financial Crisis, Congress focused efforts on mit-
igating future risky behavior in the financial industry.179 As a result, 
heightened financial regulation slowed banking activity to allow for re-
covery.180  It is now clear after a decade later that the SIFI threshold was 
set too low to mitigate concerns of moral hazard and lack of financial 
oversight.181  Raising the SIFI threshold from $50 billion to $250 billion 
was long overdue and will result in a stronger and healthier financial in-
dustry.  The Economic Growth Act will support increased M&A activity 
among BHCs with total assets just below $50 billion.182  The biggest tar-
get of acquisitions in this M&A rich environment will be de novo banks 
which will help larger BHCs expand banking services to the unbanked 
and underbanked consumers by expanding their financial services of-
fered.183 
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